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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
PACKAGING CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM W. MORRIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14517 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was an action by a packaging manufacturer to recover on 
a personal guaranty allegedly executed by Defendant Morris (Morris ) 
on behalf of a now defunct corporation. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court awarded Plaintiff Packaging Corporation of America 
("PCA") judgment in the amount of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) 
together with court costs of Twenty Eight Dollars ($28.00) and at-
torney's fees of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks reversal of the lower courtfs 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant William Morris was a shareholder of Hawkeye Invest-
ment Company ("Hawkeye Investment11) , a Nevada corporation. Early 
in 1971, Hawkeye Investment purchased the assets of Bakker's Royal 
Dutch Cookies in Utah through a court-appointed receivership. The 
corporation leased the premises and operated the cookie plant at 
Draper, Utah. (Trial Record /hereinafter cited as "R.f7 at 2-3). 
At about the same time, Hawkeye Investment began dealing with PCA 
who agreed to supply Hawkeye Investment with cookie cartons for 
its product. Since the business was new and experiencing cash flow 
problems, PCA at first refused to extend credit to Hawkeye Investme 
and all orders were shipped C.O.D. (R. 49, 59-60). 
In early 1971, Morris and William Birkinshaw ("Birkinshaw"), th 
President of Hawkeye Investment, approached the credit manager of 
PCA to see if there was a possibility that Hawkeye Investment coulc 
get an open account with PCA. PCA's area credit manager agreed to 
open an account if the account were personally guaranteed by an 
individual with an interest in Hawkeye Investment. (R. at 6). Bott 
Morris and Birkinshaw signed, as co-guarantors, a personal guaranty 
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for Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) at that time. (R. at 67). 
Once the account was opened, PCA extended credit to Hawkeye 
Investment over and above the limits of the $10,000.00 personal 
guaranty without notice to Morris. (R. at 36-37). By January 31, 
1972, PCA's area credit manager estimated that PCA had extended 
credit to Hawkeye Investment amounting to approximately $22,000.00 
or $23,000.00. (R. at 33). In February, 1972, PCA approached 
Morris for an extended personal guaranty to cover this excess credit. 
(R. at 8, 18). At no time was Morris ever informed that the out-
standing indebtedness was already well above the $20,000.00 level. 
(R. at 36-37, 86-87). After some negotiation, PCA prepared a 
$20,000.00 guaranty form with specifically designated signature 
lines for both Birkinshaw and Morris. (R. at 12, 17). The form 
was first sent to Morris who signed it on the understanding that 
Birkinshaw would also sign, and that his agreement was predicated 
on Birkinshawfs action. (R. at 84-85). The form was then returned 
to PCA which failed to obtain Birkinshawfs signature (R. at 12, 17). 
Morris is not a resident of Utah. His discussions with PCA 
personnel were nearly all conducted through long distance telephone 
from Nevada where he resides. He was in the state of Utah only twice 
in each of the two years from 1971 to 1972. These visits related to 
his business interests within the state; they did not concern the 
personal guaranties Morris had signed. (R. at 88-89)• 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT JUDGMENT IS INVALID BECAUSE THE COURT 
LACKED PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT. 
In holding that it had personal jurisdiction over Morris, the 
lower court ignored a long line of cases from this Court holding 
that there can be no long-arm jurisdiction asserted unless the 
defendant's contacts with the forum state relate directly to the 
transaction from which the claim allegedly arose. 
The Utah Long Arm Statute, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Sections 78-
27-22, et seq., has been construed several times by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction over Defendant Morris 
under its statutory provisions which state: 
Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or res-
ident of this state, who in person or through an 
agent does any of the following . . . acts, sub-
mits himself . . . to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any claim arising; from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this 
state . . . . /Emphasis added/ 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-27-24 (1953). 
But Plaintiff's reliance is misplaced. Implicit in the statute 
are the "fundamental notions of due process" announced by the Unite* 
States Supreme Court in the landmark decision International Shoe Co 
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945): 
/I/n order to subject a defendant to a judgment 
in personam, if he be not present within the 
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territory of the forum, he /must/ have 
certain minimum contacts with it such 
that the maintenance of the suit does 
not offend 'traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.1 /Emphasis 
added/ 
The essential minimum contacts required by the Utah Long Arm Statute, 
as it has been interpreted by this Court are lacking in this case, 
Morris1 meeting in Draper, Utah during 1971, his two visits to Utah 
during 1971 and his two visits during 1972 were not related to the 
personal guaranty. Morris was simply overseeing his business in-
terests in the state. Therefore, the lower court did not have in 
personam jurisdiction over Defendant under any of the statutefs 
provisions. 
This Courtfs recent decision in Mack Finanacial Corp. v. Nevada 
Motor Rentals, Inc., 529 P.2d 429 (Utah, 1974) illustrates a critical 
aspect of Section 24 which Plaintiff seems to have entirely over-
looked. In that case, the defendant Nevada corporation entered into 
a contract to purchase trucks from the plaintiff, who maintained a 
business office in Utah. The contracts were entirely negotiated in 
Colorado and signed in Denver. Defendant drove the trucks to Utah 
and at one point sent an agent to Salt Lake City to obtain permis-
sion to assign the purchase contracts for the trucks to a third 
party. When the assignee failed to make payments the plaintiff in-
stituted suit against the Nevada defendant, alleging that the acts 
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of the defendant in Utah satisfied the minimum contacts requirement 
for purposes of a suit on the purchase price. Noting that the act 
of driving in the state would give Utah courts jurisdiction of case* 
arising from injuries arising from such driving, the Court reversed 
the lower court and held that the contacts of defendant in Utah wer< 
not sufficient to establish a business presence for purposes of the 
suit on the purchase price. 
It seems clear that a suit questioning the validity of the as-
signment in the Mack Financial case as well as one involving a true! 
accident would have been properly maintainable in Utah. But the 
Court, without specifically citing it, applied the explicit provisL 
of Section 24 that jurisdiction is invoked only "as to any claim 
arising from11 the enumerated acts. It does not matter that a defen 
dant may have had extensive contacts with the state of Utah wholly 
irrelevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit. If the acts from 
which the claim arose do not have one of the statutory nexes with t 
state of Utah, there is no basis for the extension of jurisdiction 
to a non-resident defendant. 
In several recent decisions construing Section 24, this Court 
has held that non-resident defendants with even greater contacts 
connected with the respective plaintiff's causes of action were not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts. In Transwestern 
General Agency v. Morgan, 526 P.2d 1186 (Utah, 1974), the defendant 
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through his insurance agent, initiated contact with a Utah insurance 
agency to obtain liability insurance. This single contact was held 
insufficient to establish in personam jurisdiction in the insurance 
company's suit to recover an earned premium on the policy. In the 
instant case, the initial contact in negotiating the guaranty docu-
ment was made by Plaintiff in the state of Nevada, and there was no 
connection with the state of Utah with respect to the guaranty itself. 
In Kocha v. Gobson Products Co., 525 P.2d 580 (Utah, 1975), the 
defendant manufactured wire merchandise racks, one of which arrived 
through the stream of commerce in Utah and injured the plaintiff. 
The Court held that no sufficient connection with Utah causing the 
injury had been shown. 
In Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's Boats & Motors, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 
233, 494 P.2d 532 (1972), plaintiff sued to recover the purchase 
price of boats sold from Utah to an Oregon defendant on a theory that 
by failing to pay the price defendant had converted the boats, causing 
injury to plaintiff in Utah. The Court rejected the argument as 
insufficient to meet the minimum contracts requirement of the due 
process clause. 
Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959), was de-
cided before the enactment of Section 24, but involved an identical 
Illinois statute. In that case, this Court gave three factors sup-
porting its decision that an Illinois extension of jurisdiction was 
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invalid: (1) the out-of-state buyer (a Utah buyer outside of 
Illinois) had not taken the initiative; (2) the contract was 
consummated outside of Illinois; and (3) no damage was done to 
the citizens of Illinois by the defendant's failure to make payment 
to the plaintiff. In the instant case, the contract was consum-
mated in the state of Nevada, and no injury has been done to any 
citizen of Utah by any action of Defendant Morris. 
None of the acts alleged by Plaintiff establish any nexus what-
ever between the negotiations concerning the signing of the docu-
ment from which this claim arose. Morris1 four visits to the state 
of Utah during 1971 and 1972 were not made in connection with the 
$20,000.00 guaranty. It was undisputed at trial that Morris came 
into the state on those occasions to look after business interests 
separate from the guaranty. (R. at 88-89). The alleged acts were 
therefore, as a matter of law, insufficient to confer jurisdiction 
on the lower court with respect to the claim before it. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUARANTY WAS 
COMPLETE AND THEREFORE ENFORCEABLE AGAINST MORRIS. 
Though the matter has naturally not been the subject of frequer 
litigation in Utah, it is well settled law that a guaranty contain! 
the conditional signature of one proposed guarantor, subject to the 
additional signature of another party, is not valid without the 
subsequent signature of the other party. This Court recognized thi 
principle in State Bank v. Burton-Gardner Co,. 14 Utah 420, 423, 
48 P.402, 403 (1897): 
Undoubtedly the law is that one or more 
persons may sign a note or guaranty, and 
deliver it to the payee with the agree-
ment that they shall not be bound unless 
other persons named shall sign also; and, 
if such other persons do not sign, that 
those signing shall not be held. 
As the Court in Wall v. Eccles, 61 Utah 247, 252, 211 p. 702, 704 
(1922) noted, the issue "presents a mixed question of law and fact". 
There is yet another rule that applies to this issue in the case 
at bar. The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental 
rule that vague, ambiguous, or uncertain terms in a contract should 
be strictly construed against the documentfs framer. General 
Appliance Corp. v. Haw. Inc. 30 Utah 2d 238, 516 P.2d 346 (1973); 
Seal v. Tavco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965); See 
Financial Corp. v. Prudential Carbon & Ribbon Co.. 29 Utah 2d 238, 
507 P.2d 1026 (1973). 
In Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 233, 500 P.2d 503 (1965), 
this Court applied the principle to find the plaintiff liable on 
defendant!s counterclaim despite ambiguous language in the contract 
which purportedly exculpated plaintiff from liability for special 
or consequential damages. The Court stated: 
/I/n cases of uncertainty as to the meaning 
of the contract, it should be construed most 
strictly against its framer . . . . /I/t seems 
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manifestly unfair to permit one who 
formulates a contract to so fashion 
it as to mislead the other party by 
setting forth a clearly apparent 
promise or representation in order 
to induce acceptance, and then design-
edly burying elsewhere in the document 
. . . provisions which proport to limit 
or take away the promise and/or preclude 
recovery for failure to fulfill it. 
Id. at 326,400 P.2d at 505. 
This Court recognized the principle would also apply to ambig-
uous terms contained in a personal guaranty in General Appliance 
Corp. v. Haw, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 238, 516 P.2d 346 (1973). That case 
involved shareholders who withdrew from an unprofitable carpet re-
tailing corporation which had incurred debts to plaintiff. The 
shareholders formed a new corporation, to carry on the business. 
Since plaintiff refused to deal with them otherwise, the share-
holders executed a personal guaranty making them "responsible for 
the payment of the purchase price of . . . merchandise . . . sold 
or delivered11 to the new corporation. When plaintiff brought suit 
to hold the shareholders liable for debts of the first corporation 
which had been assumed by the new corporation, this Court denied 
recovery, stating: 
The guaranties were drawn by plaintiff, and 
if there were any uncertainty or ambiguity 
as to the meaning of the terms of the con-
tract, it would be construed strictly against 
the framer. 
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Id., at 241, 516 P.2d at 347-48. But the Court went on to find that 
there was no ambiguity because the term "sale11 clearly did not include 
prior debts assumed by the new corporation. 
Finally, the Court impliedly recognized that the principle 
could have applicability in a case similar to the one at bar, Finan-
cial Corp. v. Prudential Carbon & Ribbon Co.%29 Utah 2d 238, 507 P.2d 
1026 (1973). In that case plaintiff sued defendants to recover on a 
personal guaranty allegedly executed by defendants on behalf of their 
corporation. One defendant argued that he was not bound by the 
guaranty because he had signed it solely in reliance upon plaintiff's 
false representation that the other defendant had already signed. 
The Court rejected this defense only because the other defendant was 
estopped to deny his signature on the guaranty. 
The case at bar is an instance where the rule should apply. 
Plaintiff prepared the $20,000.00 guaranty with two signature lines 
designated for Morris and Birkinshaw. Morris was thus led to believe 
that this guaranty, like the $10,000.00 guaranty executed earlier, 
was to be a joint and conditional guaranty, enforceable only if 
Birkinshaw also signed. But the Plaintiff did not even ask Birkinshaw 
to sign the document and now seeks to recover the entire amount from 
Morris. It is submitted that the Court should apply the rule recog-
nized in the above cases and it should construe the terms of the 
guaranty contract, including its misleading signature designations, 
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strictly against the Plaintiff, its framer. As the Court noted in 
Seal v, Tayco, Inc., supra, Plaintiff should not be permitted to bei 
fit from the uncertainty and ambiguity it created in drafting the c< 
tract. It is submitted that this Court should support the intent o 
the parties and find that the contract was a joint and conditional 
guaranty, not enforceable against Morris alone. 
POINT III 
THE GUARANTY IS UNENFORCEABLE FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION. 
It has long been recognized that a guaranty is not enforceable 
unless it is supported by consideration. Such consideration may 
be in the form of a benefit to the guarantor or a detriment to the 
creditor. In Armstrong v. Cache Valley Land & Canal Co., 14 Utah 
450, 48 P.690 (1897), this Court held that a personal guaranty for 
defendants1 note was not enforceable because defendants had given 
bonds and securities as collateral for the note, and the guaranty 
was not supported by any other consideration. In essence, the Cour 
reasoned, defendants derived no benefit from the guaranty. 
Consideration may also come in the form of assurances and in-
ducements made prior to execution of the principal contract. But 
where the plaintiff enters into a contract without any expectation 
or assurances that it will be personally guaranteed, courts general 
have held the guaranty unenforceable for lack of consideration. Fc 
example, in Northern State Construct. Co. v. Robbins., 457 P.2d 187 
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(Wash. 1969), the Supreme Court of Washington held that since the 
guaranty was dated after the principal construction and there was 
no indication that a guaranty was expected, the guaranty was without 
consideration and unenforceable. See Gelco IVM Leasing Co. v. Alger, 
6 Wash. App. 519, 494 P.2d 501 (1972). (Guaranty held unenforceable 
for lack of consideration where principle five-year lease contract 
was entered into prior to guaranty without indications that guaranty 
was expected). 
In the case at bar, Defendant Morris likewise received no benefit 
from executing the personal guaranty. Late in 1971, before the 
$20,000.00 guaranty was executed, PCA had extended over $20,000.00 in 
credit to Hawkeye International, well beyond the $10,000.00 amount 
covered by the first guaranty. It was not until early in 1972 that 
Plaintifff PCA finally asked Defendants to execute a second guaranty 
for $20,000.00. Prior to that time Defendant had made no assurances, 
nor had PCA requested any. Since Defendant received no benefit and 
Plaintiff incurred no detriment for the $20,000.00 guaranty, it is not 
supported by consideration and therefore, unenforceable. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court against Defendant Morris should 
be reversed. The lower court did not have personal jurisdiction 
over Morris to render judgment. Moreover, the guaranty is unenforceable 
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because of its conditional nature and because it was not supported 
by consideration. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Paul T. Moxley / / 
JOHNSON & SPACKMAN ' / 
1320 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Certificate of Service 
The foregoing Brief of Defendant-Appellant William W. Morris 
was served upon Plaintiff-Respondent Packaging Corporation of 
America by mailing, postage prepaid, two copies to its attorney, 
Lauren N. Beasley, of Cotro-Manes, Warr, Fankhauser & Beasley, at 
430 Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this If day 
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